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The Federal Reserve System has been making 
monetary policy in the dark. It has had to; econ-
omists simply have not agreed on a theory that 
satisfactorily explains the use of money in the 
economy and tells public policy makers what 
they should do about it. But a theory does exist 
which includes what's essential for a good 
theory of money. Economists should recognize 
it as the best available, and the Fed should not 
ignore its policy implications, for they are very 
different from current practice. 
What is essential for a good theory of 
money? 
Most basically, the theory must explain 
facts. Why do people use some objects for ex-
change and why some objects more than 
others? Specifically, why do people value and 
use fiat money—intrinsically worthless stuff 
the issuer will not convert into anything? 
To explain the role of fiat money, a good 
theory must include ''friction." In standard eco-
nomic theory, markets work too well; people 
communicate and trade in fictitious markets 
without using up resources. As a result, stan-
dard economic theory cannot explain the limita-
tions of markets—limitations that account for 
phenomena like centralized planning, firms as 
ways of organizing economic activity, nonprice 
allocation schemes like first-come, first-served, 
and the use of money.
1 Without some friction 
that inhibits the operation of markets, there can 
be no role for a lubricant like money. 
To determine the best role for public policy, 
a good theory of money must let monetary poli-
cies be evaluated in the same way economists 
evaluate other governmental actions: in terms 
of economic efficiency. An allocation of re-
sources is efficient or nonwasteful if no one 
could feasibly be made better off by a change 
without also making someone worse off. 
Without a theory that describes efficient alloca-
tions, monetary policy makers have adopted 
high employment, stable prices, and growth as 
goals. But as will be demonstrated, the pursuit 
of such goals can be inconsistent with the pur-
suit of efficiency. 
The simple theory you will read about in this 
article does what a good theory of money must. 
It contains a friction that accounts for some ba-
sic facts about money, and it allows monetary 
policies to be evaluated in terms of efficiency, 
the usual goal of public policy. 
The results of that evaluation are important 
for the Federal Reserve System. To achieve ef-
ficiency, this theory says the Fed should limit it-
self to holding constant the supply of U.S. fiat 
money (currency plus deposits of commercial 
banks at the Fed). This is quite different from 
1On markets vs. planning see L. Hurwlcz, "The Design of Mechanisms 
for Resource Allocation," AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, May 1973, 
and V. Smith, "Economic Theory and its Discontents," AMERICAN ECO-
NOMIC REVIEW, May 1974. On firms see R. H. Coase, "The Nature of 
the Firm," in AEA READINGS IN PRICE THEORY, eds. Stigler and 
Boulding (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1952), VI. Coase argues 
that firms exist as substitutes for markets; think of much vs. little vertical 
integration (few vs. many markets). For some remarks on first-come, first-
served see N. Wallace, "Microeconomic Theories of Macroeconomic Phe-
nomena and Their Implications for Monetary Policy," in A PRESCRIPTION 
FOR MONETARY POLICY: PROCEEDINGS FROM A SEMINAR SERIES, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 1976. 
2 the Fed's current practice of tinkering with var-
ious other measures of the money supply, a 





Consider a discrete time economy in which peo-
ple live two periods (young in the first period, 
old in the second), and N new people appear 
each period. Each young person is endowed 
with some amount of a single nonstorable con-
sumption good. (You may think of young people 
as having labor that can be used to produce the 
nonstorable consumption good and of old peo-
ple as unable to work.) Nothing but their own 
consumption matters to these people: more con-
sumption is preferred to less, and everyone 
would like to consume something in both 
periods. 
Thus, on any date this economy has some 
young people, some old people, and a fixed 
amount of the one nonstorable consumption 
good. We are going to judge the efficiency or 
nonwastefulness of various ways of distributing 
the consumption good. In doing that, we will 
take into account those who are currently alive— 
the current old and the current young—and all 
future generations. It is, by the way, a critical 
feature of this economy that it has no last 
generation. 
A Wasteful Market Solution 
If we, so to speak, let matters take their course 
in this economy, then a likely outcome is that 
the current young and the young in each future 
period consume their endowment, but no one 
gets to consume when old. Call this the "no-
trade allocation.'' I want to prove that this is a 
wasteful allocation, that the fixed amount of the 
consumption good can be divided in the current 
and in every future period to make everyone 
better off than under the no-trade allocation. 
For the moment, suppose that everyone has 
identical preferences and endowment, and let 
the endowment of each young person be Y units 
of the nonstorable consumption good. Let Ci be 
consumption when young and C2 consumption 
when old. Moreover, suppose that the con-
sumption bundle (Ci, C2) = (Y/2, Y/2) is pre-
ferred to the bundle (Ci, C2) = (Y, 0). That is, 
everyone prefers to get something when they're 
both young and old, not just when they're 
young. 
Obviously, the fixed amount of the con-
sumption good, NY, available to society each 
period could be divided so that each of the 2N 
people alive at each date gets Y/2 units. This 
produces (Ci, C2) = (Y/2, Y/2) as lifetime con-
sumption for every young person and Y/2 as 
second-period consumption for the current old. 
This allocation would be preferred by everyone 
or dominates the no-trade allocation which 
gives the young a lifetime consumption of (Y, 0) 
and the current old nothing. 
But how can a market produce this dominant 
allocation or any allocation in which people get 
to consume something when old? Clearly the 
young in each period have to surrender part of 
their endowment to the old. But what can the 
old give in exchange? In a sense, they have 
nothing, particularly nothing that would bind or 
commit the next period's young to turn over 
some of their endowment to the then-old. This 
is the friction that allows this model to have a 
role for fiat money. 
A Fiat-Money Solution 
By definition, fiat money is unbacked or incon-
vertible money; the issuer does not promise to 
exchange it for anything else. Today the United 
States' fiat money consists of outstanding cur-
rency plus deposits of commercial banks at the 
Federal Reserve (sometimes it's called "high-
powered" money or the monetary base). One 
way to check this is to consolidate everyone's 
balance sheets; what is left as wealth is all real 
assets (buildings, land, animals, etc.) and fiat 
money.
3 
2P. A. Samuelson, "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest With 
or Without the Social Contrivance of Money," JOURNAL OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY, December 1958. 
3TO get this answer, one must regard government interest-bearing debt 
as claims on future taxes against which taxpayers have an offsetting liabil-
ity. 
3 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
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Fiat money is also intrinsically worthless. It 
cannot be an object wanted for its own sake (to 
be consumed), nor should it help produce the 
consumption good (as labor and land do). To 
have a theory of fiat money, then, is to explain 
the circumstances under which intrinsically 
worthless stuff ends up having value as it does 
when it is accepted in exchange for things like 
the consumption good of the model we have 
been describing. 
Once defined this way, fiat money obviously 
has value at any date only if people believe it 
will have value at the next date. So expectations 
play an important role in any theory of fiat 
money. Moreover, we see why the never-ending 
nature of our model is critical. Were there to be 
a last generation, fiat money could not have 
value when the last generation was old. But 
then it could not have had value when they 
were young, and so on, leading to the conclu-
sion that fiat money could never have value. 
Now if the old people currently alive have 
some fiat money and if this amount will never 
be changed, then there exists an equilibrium in 
which fiat money has value, an equilibrium that 
produces a nonwasteful allocation. 
By "equilibrium" I mean a price sequence 
(a sequence of values of fiat money at each date 
in units of the consumption good at that date) 
and an allocation (a description of who gets 
what in which "who" includes everyone alive 
now and in the future) that satisfies the follow-
ing properties: 
• Individuals' choices are optimizing and sub-
ject to them assuming current and future 
values of fiat money and being right about 
the future value. 
• Those choices clear the market in each peri-
od; the total demand for fiat money by the 
young equals the amount offered by the old. 
For precision, such an equilibrium might be 
called a competitive, perfect-foresight, or ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium, but I will simply 
call it an equilibrium. 
How does our fiat-money economy work? 
In each period, the old people offer at any 
price all the fiat money they have. This consti-
tutes the supply of fiat money. The young peo-
ple are demanders of fiat money, but in general 
their demand depends on the value of fiat 
money now and in the next period and on their 
preferences. Because conditions remain un-
changed over time in this economy, in equilib-
rium the value of fiat money could remain con-
stant from period to period; the supply of fiat 
money does not change nor do the factors that 
influence the demand. 
If the value of fiat money is positive and con-
stant, then young people believe they can ex-
change one unit of their endowment for one 
unit of consumption next period. In other 
words, they face a zero interest rate and a 
choice set—a set of possibilities for first-period 
consumption, Ci, and second-period consump-
tion, C2—shown as the shaded area in Figure 1. 
The equilibrium value of fiat money is deter-
mined by the preferences of the young, by their 
choice of a point on the upper boundary of the 
choice set. 
To pin matters down, we suppose that they 
display no time preference; when given the 
chance to trade one unit of first-period con-
sumption for one unit of second-period con-
sumption, they choose equal amounts of the 
two. In other words, they choose (Ci, C2) = 
(Y/2, Y/2).
4 This means that each young per-
son offers Y/2 units of her or his endowment in 
exchange for fiat money or that in the aggregate 
NY/2 units of the consumption good are of-
fered. If we let M denote the number of units of 
fiat money supplied, each unit exchanges for 
(NY/2)/M units of the consumption good each 
period. It is easy to verify that such a price se-
quence is an equilibrium according to the defi-
nition given above. 
We can also indicate why the resulting al-
location is nonwasteful, at least among the 
class of allocations that treat all young people of 
4An example of a utility function consistent with such preferences is the 
function 
4 all generations the same.
5 Any such allocation 
limits the consumption bundle of young people 
to the shaded area in Figure 1. Given the as-
sumed preferences, the bundle (Ci, C2) = 
(Y12, Y/2) is best from their standpoint. While 
the current old would get more if the young 
were constrained to a point southeast of point 
A, say, A', the current young and the young of 
all future generations would be worse off. (All 
points on the line segment connecting A and B, 
including the points A and B, are nonwasteful.) 
Points like A" on the boundary northwest of A 
are wasteful because both the young and the 
current old are worse off there than at A. The 
current old in the aggregate consume what the 
young do not consume. Thus, at A" the per 
capita consumption of the old is Z, while at the 
fixed-supply fiat-money equilibrium it is X. Ob-
viously, the no-trade allocation is the worst 
point on the upper boundary of the choice set. 
A Deflationary Example 
The above fiat-money solution includes a fixed 
stock of fiat money, a constant price level, and a 
nonwasteful allocation. Is the constant value of 
fiat money an essential feature, or is it an acci-
dent, just special to that example? To answer 
this, consider a slightly different model: Let the 
endowment of successive generations grow by 
the factor g so that each young person of gener-
ation t has an endowment of the nonstorable 
consumption good equal to Y(1 + g)\ 
First suppose that the quantity of fiat money 
is unchanging and equal to M. Since the quanti-
ty of the consumption good is increasing expo-
nentially at the rate g, the value of this fixed 
quantity of fiat money must increase, that is, 
deflation occurs. And, in fact, there is an equi-
librium in which the value of money grows expo-
nentially at the rate g, implying that young peo-
ple face an interest rate of g. The upper bound-
ary of the corresponding choice set is the rela-
tively flat line in Figure 2. The equilibrium al-
location is, in general, a point like A.
6 
Now suppose instead that monetary policy 
keeps the value of fiat money constant. This re-
quires that the quantity of fiat money be in-
creased, in fact, by g percent per period. We 
may suppose that this required amount is 
handed out each period to the old people with 
each old person getting the same amount.
7 
Everyone knows that this is the monetary 
policy. 
5For a general proof see J. Kareken and N. Wallace, "Portfolio Autarky, 
A Welfare Analysis," JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 7, 
1977. 
®The line through A passes through the endowment Y(1 + g)* and has 
slope equal to -1/(1 +g). The point Q is determined by the intersection of 
that line and the line that passes through the origin with slope equal to one. 
How do we know that point A lies southeast of point Q rather than north-
west of Q, say at A'? Well, suppose to the contrary that A' is chosen when 
the boundary of the budget set is the line passing through Q and A. We 
know that if the choice set boundary were CQB, then Q would be chosen, 
implying that Q is preferred to A". But A" is preferred to A'. Hence, Q is 
preferred to A
1. This contradicts the assumed choice of A
1 when the choice 
set boundary is the line through Q and A. 
7This handout must be viewed by individuals as independent of the 
amount of money they acquire when young, but the handout needn't go to 
them when they are old; it could as well go to them when they are young. 
5 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
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This policy keeps the value of fiat money 
constant. It now looks to young people as if 
their budget set is bounded by the line CB in 
Figure 2. The equilibrium consumption bundle 
is at point Q.
8 But the bundle at point A is, in 
general, preferred to that at point Q. That is, 
the current young and all members of all future 
generations are better off under deflation than 
under the policy that keeps the price level con-
stant. The current old also are better off, for 
under deflation their per capita consumption is 
the quantity X, while under the policy that 
keeps the value of fiat money constant it is only 
Z. For this model, this proves that a policy of 
holding constant the amount of fiat money and 
letting deflation occur dominates one that 
keeps the value of money constant. 
In a wide variety of models like those dis-
cussed above, a policy of holding constant the 
quantity of fiat money produces a nonwasteful 
allocation. This can imply a rising value of 
money (deflation), as in the last example, or a 
falling value of money (inflation). Whichever, 
the resulting allocation cannot be dominated. 
Complicating the Model 
Like all theories, this one abstracts from certain 
details of the real world and should not be re-
jected because of that. Still, you may have some 
qualms about taking its implications seriously. 
After all, where are banks and other financial 
intermediaries? What about assets other than 
fiat money? Shouldn't we consider business 
cycles? And what about international monetary 
relations? 
Private Borrowing and Lending 
Does the presence of private borrowing and 
lending in an economy alter the conclusion that 
a policy of holding constant the stock of fiat 
money cannot be dominated? To find out, the 
model described above can be adjusted to in-
clude private borrowing and lending. Although 
it is something of a copout, we can regard finan-
cial intermediaries as institutions that do no 
more than carry out various kinds of borrowing 
and lending.
9 
Economists know that to formulate a model 
in which this kind of trading occurs they must 
populate it with people who differ from one an-
other in either time preference or endowment. 
We take the latter route. 
Suppose that some young of each generation 
are endowed with some amount of nonstorable 
first-period consumption and others with some 
amount of second-period consumption. In gen-
eral, the latter, when young, will want to bor-
row from the former.
1
0
 In what sense, if any, 
does this borrowing and lending substitute for 
fiat money? 
If the aggregate endowment is, so to speak, 
tilted sufficiently toward second-period con-
sumption, then there is not an equilibrium in 
which fixed-supply fiat money has value. And, 
indeed, then fiat money is not needed; the mar-
ket equilibrium that arises without it is non-
wasteful. 
But if the aggregate endowment is tilted 
sufficiently toward first-period consumption— 
the limiting case being the model of the last 
section—then there is an equilibrium in which 
fixed-supply fiat money has value. And in such 
circumstances the market equilibrium that 
arises without fiat money is wasteful, while the 
equilibrium with it is not. Therefore, the mere 
existence of private borrowing and lending 
does not eliminate the role of fiat money. 
But private borrowing and lending and fiat 
money do sometimes substitute for each other. 
So economies of the kind we have been describ-
ing that differ only in the degree to which ag-
gregate endowments are tilted toward first-
period consumption display an inverse relation-
ship between the amount of private debt and 
the total value of fiat money. Also, economies 
that differ only because fiat money is being al-
8Recall our assumption about preferences. 
9A copout because intermediaries are firms, not mere veils. See foot-
note 1. 
10lf the second-period endowment is uncertain, then the borrowing and 
lending takes more subtle forms. There is, then, room in the model for risk-
sharing agreements and portfolios diversified in a determinate way. 
6 tered at different rates can display an inverse 
relationship between the total value of fiat 
money and the inflation rate. And finally, in 
such models various restrictions on private bor-
rowing and lending—for example, an outright 
prohibition or a tax on it—enhance the demand 
for fiat money. 
While these aspects of substitution between 
private debt and fiat money help explain wide-
spread government interference with private 
debt creation (much more in other countries 
than here), they do not by themselves justify 
such interference. 
If a government or monetary authority is 
charged with maintaining the value of fiat 
money, then it must be concerned with every-
thing that goes on in the economy. If in the 
economy we have been describing the degree to 
which the aggregate endowment is tilted to-
ward second-period consumption is increasing 
over time, then unless something is done the 
value of the fixed quantity of fiat money de-
clines. In other words, there is inflation. The 
same happens if g is negative in the example 
above (the economy is shrinking rather than 
growing) or if over time technological develop-
ments make storing the consumption good 
easier and easier. 
In their effects, such developments are simi-
lar to payments mechanism developments that 
reduce the demand for fiat money. As we saw 
in the last section, however, if the goal of mone-
tary policy is to achieve a nonwasteful allocation 
of resources, then none of them calls for a re-
sponse from the monetary authority. Its prob-
lem is not the development that threatens to al-
ter the value of fiat money, but the goal of 
trying to keep that value constant.
1
1 
Other Assets and Institutions 
In the model with private borrowing and lend-
ing, valued fixed-supply fiat money would exist 
only if the endowment is on average tilted to-
ward first-period consumption. Would the 
presence of other assets or institutions weaken 
the need for such fiat money? Samuelson's 
model can be adapted to find out. 
Other Physical Assets 
No doubt you noticed that valued fiat money is 
the only asset in the models of the first section. 
Whether or not fiat money would be valued if 
other physical assets existed depends on the 
characteristics of those assets. We will consider 
two examples. 
First, suppose the consumption good of the 
first model is storable; if k units are stored, the 
result is xk units the next period. If there is de-
preciation (x<1), then an equilibrium with 
valued fixed-supply fiat money exists which is 
nonwasteful. If there is appreciation (x>1), 
then an equilibrium in which a fixed supply of 
fiat money has value does not exist. But with 
appreciation the nonfiat-money equilibrium is 
nonwasteful. 
In neither of these equilibria do individuals 
want to hold diversified portfolios. Diversified 
portfolios can be produced by complicating the 
storage technology, in particular, by making it 
uncertain. For example, suppose two outcomes 
of storage are possible and equally likely: x = .6 
and x = 1.5. Then for a wide range of prefer-
ences, there is an equilibrium in which the 
young hold some valued fiat money and store 
some of the consumption good. But generally, a 
fixed-supply fiat-money equilibrium exists only 
if the storage technology is not too productive. 
Next, suppose there is a distinct physical as-
set like land. If it is uniform, productive, and 
nondepreciating, then it dominates fixed-sup-
ply fiat money as an asset, and land and valued 
fiat money cannot coexist. However, if land is 
assumed to physically depreciate in the course 
of being used, then it and valued fiat money can 
coexist. 
Is it a defect of these models that they make 
a fiat-money equilibrium depend on the physi-
cal characteristics of other potential assets? 
Should we look for models that allow valued 
1
1
 For a more detailed but still incomplete discussion of laissez-faire toward 
the financial intermediation industry, see N. Wallace, "A Payments 
Mechanism Without Fed Involvement and Fed Monetary Policy Without 
Required Reserves," Research Department Staff Report #15, Federal Re-
serve Bank of Minneapolis, 1977. 
7 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
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fixed-supply fiat money to coexist with an ap-
preciating consumption good or land that is uni-
form, productive, and nondepreciating? 
I doubt that a search for such models would 
be successful. And why try? Physically appreci-
ating consumption goods don't seem to exist. 
And while it may be a useful abstraction for 
some purposes to assume that a homogeneous, 
nonreproducible form of capital like nondepre-
ciating, productive land exists, such an abstrac-
tion is disastrous for explaining why titles to 
land have not played a prominent commodity-
money role historically. 
Still, you may ask, must the "stuff'
1 with 
which we endow the old be fiat money? Couldn't 
it be something found in nature? 
The properties that natural stuff would need 
are homogeneity and exogenous supply. And 
those natural objects that have played promi-
nent commodity-money roles—gold, for ex-
ample—have to some extent displayed these 
properties. But it seems doubtful that any stuff 
found in nature could approximate these prop-
erties better than well-managed fiat money. 
Other Institutions 
Other institutions can substitute for valued fiat 
money in Samuelson's model; he emphasized a 
tax-transfer scheme like Social Security. But 
while it may be easy to implement the right 
Social Security scheme in a very simple model, 
it would not be easy in complicated models in 
which, for example, people differ. Even in 
those models, however, the fiat money solution 
would work. 
But, again, must the government provide 
the fiat money? If not, who? In the simple 
model, every person alive at the initial date 
would like to be the sole issuer of a store of 
value. How do we settle on one or several? It 
may be begging the question to say that there 
must be a social decision, but certainly the 
usual appeal to free entry and private incentives 




For many the principal role of monetary policy 
is countercyclical policy. And for them it must 
seem especially bizarre to derive prescriptions 
for monetary policy from a model that appears 
to ignore business cycles. 
An important feature of business cycles is a 
tendency for money to expand and contract 
with economic activity (the time series evi-
dence). But some believe that the amount of 
money does not affect economic activity, and 
among different countries the average over 
time of the monetary growth rate is not associ-
ated with the average level of economic activity 
(the cross-section evidence). 
Another version of Samuelson's model at 




 The model is peopled with individuals 
who are endowed with first-period labor and 
who value leisure. Built into it are two kinds of 
uncertainty and an information barrier that pre-
vents individuals from distinguishing complete-
ly between changes in a relative price—the rate 
at which first-period consumption can be ex-
changed for second-period consumption—and 
changes in the value of fiat money that poten-
tially leave this relative price unchanged. These 
features are combined with rational expecta-
tions—the notion that individuals use in the 
best way whatever information is available to 
them. 
The resulting theory produces a positive 
time series correlation between the rate of 
change of the money supply and total output. 
This correlation, however, is due entirely to the 
uncertainty of monetary policy. The theory im-
plies the neutrality of money in relation to 
economic activity in the sense that a once-for-
all announced change in the quantity of money 
affects the value of fiat money and nothing else. 
It accounts for the cross-section evidence be-
cause total output does not depend on the 
12in A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY STABILITY (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1959), Milton Friedman argues that the only competitive 
solution is commodity money—fiat money worth no more than the paper on 
which it is printed. 
13See Robert E. Lucas, "Expectations and the Neutrality of Money," 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 4,1972. 
8 known average growth rate of the money 
supply. 
While this model does not account for all ob-
served features of business cycles (whatever 
that may mean), it currently stands as the only 
full elaborated, coherent model that approaches 




cording to it, the best the monetary authority 
can do is eliminate itself as a source of uncer-
tainty since an uncertain monetary policy clear-
ly produces a wasteful allocation. This is consis-
tent with the prescription being advocated here. 
Country-Specific Fiat Monies 
So far we have only been describing models of 
closed economies, a serious omission in matters 
involving monetary policy. The kinds of models 
described above, however, can easily be adapt-
ed to accommodate many countries and many 
fiat monies, one for each of several of the coun-
tries. Such an analysis reveals some problems 
but does not change our general conclusion. 
The model suggests that without govern-
ment restrictions artificially enhancing the de-
mand for a particular currency—capital controls 
being an important example—no international 
monetary system is consistent with uncoordi-
nated national monetary policies. Thus the 
model explains why such restrictions are per-
vasive in the world today. 
Flexible exchange rates do not by them-
selves allow countries to pursue independent 
monetary policies. Without restrictions like 
capital controls, one currency cannot depreciate 
continuously in terms of another. If it did, 
everyone would try to substitute the appreciat-
ing currency for the depreciating one. (Could 
the Canadian dollar depreciate for long at, say, 
8 percent a year in terms of the U.S. dollar?) 
Nor can an exchange rate remain unchanged 
between two currencies expanding at different 
rates. Otherwise the residents of the country 
following the less expansionary policy would be 
subsidizing residents of the other country, a 
situation that would not persist. 
Even if monetary policies are coordinated 
and, indeed, even if the quantities of the several 
fiat monies are held constant, without restric-
tions like capital controls, determining what 
exchange rates ought to be is a problem. With-
out such restrictions, exchange rates must not 
change over time, but the model does not deter-
mine their values. It just says one fiat money is 
enough. Unless made effective through restric-
tions like capital controls, national boundaries 
do not by themselves produce separate de-
mands for country-specific fiat monies. 
The presence of country-specific fiat mon-
ies, therefore, does create problems, but it 
does not affect the conclusion that a monetary 
policy that holds constant the stock of fiat 
money cannot be dominated. In particular, if all 
fiat monies are held constant, then any system 
of fixed exchange rates is consistent with an 
equilibrium that produces a nonwasteful alloca-
tion. 
Conclusion 
You may still be wondering whether to take all 
this seriously. Can the simple models I have 
been describing really tell us something? Can 
they tell us more than those 200-or-so-equation 
macroeconometric models that give numerical 
answers to many questions? 
Those large models have been notoriously 
inaccurate. But more important, despite their 
size, they cannot address all sorts of questions. 
In particular, they do not allow policies to be 
evaluated in terms of efficiency, the only kind 
of evaluation we should trust. Besides that, the 
large models are all descended from Keynesian 
macroeconomic theory, but they have not re-
solved any of the many questions about the 
merits of that theory. This should make us wary 
of expecting much from them. 
Of course, the simple models I have de-
scribed are not perfect. There are many facts 
14See Robert E. Lucas, "Understanding Business Cycles," Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 5, eds. K. Brunner and A. 
Meltzer (North Hollard, 1977), and N. Wallace, A PRESCRIPTION FOR 
MONETARY POLICY. 
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they do not confront. But they should be taken 
seriously because they are the best models 
available today for analyzing a wide range of 
questions about the government's role in the fi-
nancial system. And their implication that the 
supply of fiat money should be held constant 
appears likely to be implied by other still-to-be-
developed models. 
However, two specific qualifications should 
be acknowledged. 
The printing of money has always been rec-
ognized as one way to finance government ex-
penditures. If we assume that any method of fi-
nancing such expenditures involves coercion, 
then any method also involves costs—explicit 
collection costs and somewhat hidden distor-
tions. With this assumption, fiat-money issue is 
on a par with other ways to finance government 
expenditures, and holding the amount of it 
constant is not necessarily the best policy. 
And operating a fiat-money system, even 
one as simple as the one prescribed above, is 
not costless, as we have assumed. If we think of 
the fiat money as currency, then resources 
must be used to replace worn-out currency and 
eliminate counterfeits. 
But this last qualification should not bother 
us. As we began by saying, a theory of money 
must be a theory with friction. In a good theory 
of money, no way of managing money should 
completely overcome the friction, at least not 
without some cost in terms of resources. The 
fiat money of the models described above works 
too well; it completely overcomes the friction. 
Once we take into account the cost of operating 
a fiat-money system, this is no longer true. At 
some cost and to some extent a well-managed 
fiat-money system overcomes market friction 
just as other lubricants at some cost and to some 
extent overcome physical friction. 
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